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Abstract. A recent trend in cryptography is to protect data and com-
putation against various side-channel attacks. Dziembowski and Faust
(TCC 2012) have proposed a general way to protect arbitrary circuits
against any continual leakage assuming that: (i) the memory is divided
into the parts, which leaks independently (ii) the leakage in each obser-
vation is bounded (iii) the circuit has an access to a leak-free component,
which samples random orthogonal vectors. The pivotal element of their
construction is a protocol for refreshing the so-called Leakage-Resilient
Storage (LRS).
In this note, we present a more efficient and simpler protocol for refresh-
ing LRS under the same assumptions. Our solution needs O(n) opera-
tions to fully refresh the secret (in comparison to Ω(n2) for a protocol of
Dziembowski and Faust), where n is a security parameter that describes
the maximal amount of leakage in each invocation of the refreshing pro-
cedure.
1 Introduction
A leakage-resilient cryptography has been intensively studied in the recent years
(cf. for instance [MR04, DP08, FKPR10, GR10, DHLAW10, BKKV10, LLW11,
DF11,DF12,GR12]). This note is based on a work by Dziembowski and Faust
[DF12]. It follows the assumptions, construction and notation from the men-
tioned work. We briefly review the settings, for the complete description of the
model we refer the reader to [DF12].
We first start with the definition of the Leakage-Resilient Storage (LRS)
[DDV10], which is a randomized encoding scheme (Enc : M → L × R,Dec :
L×R →M), resilient to leakage in the following sense. Letm ∈M be a message,
and let (l, r) := Enc(m). Then, an adversary that learns some partial information
f(l) about l and (independently) g(r) about r should gain no information about
the encoded messagem. The idea is to keep l and r on the different memory parts,
which leak independently. We will model that setting assuming that they are kept
be different parties, which can perform computation and exchange messages.
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More precisely (citing verbatim [DF12]), for some c, ℓ, λ ∈ N letM1, . . . ,Mℓ ∈
{0, 1}c denote the contents of the memory parts, then we define a λ-leakage game
played between an adaptive adversary A, called a λ-limited leakage adversary,
and a leakage oracle Ω(M1, . . . ,Mℓ) as follows. For some m ∈ N, the adver-
sary A can adaptively issue a sequence {(xi, fi)}
m
i=1 of requests to the oracle
Ω(M1, . . . ,Mℓ), where xi ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} and fi : {0, 1}
c → {0, 1}λi with λi ≤ λ.
To each such a query the oracle replies with fi(Mxi) and we say that in this case
the adversary A retrieved the value fi(Mxi) from Mxi . The only restriction is
that in total the adversary does not retrieve more than λ bits from each memory
part. In the following, let (A⇄ (M1, . . . ,Mℓ)) be the output of A at the end of
this game.
An LRS Φ is said to be (λ, ǫ)-secure, if for any S, S′ ∈ M and any λ-limited
adversary A, we have ∆(A⇄ (L,R);A⇄ (L′, R′)) ≤ ǫ, where (L,R)← Enc(S)
and (L′, R′)← Enc(S′), for any two secrets S, S′ ∈M.
A variant of LRS Φn
F
introduced in [DF11] is based of the inner-product
extractor. A secret S ∈ F (where F is an arbitrary finite field) is encoded using
two random vectors L,R ∈ Fn, such that S = 〈L,R〉. In this note we only allow
the encodings such that L,R ∈ (F \ {0})n. Moreover, we will assume that F is
fairly large in comparison to n, that is |F| ≥ 4n. Dziembowski and Faust [DF12]
showed the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose |F| = Ω(n). Then, LRS Φn
F
is (0.49 · log2 |F
n|− 1, negl(n))-
secure, for some negligible function negl.
Dziembowski and Faust [DF12] have proposed a compiler, which transforms
arbitrary circuits over F into functionally equivalent circuits secure against any
continual leakage assuming that:
1. the memory is divided into the parts, which leak independently,
2. the leakage from each memory part is bounded,
3. the circuit has an access to a leak-free component, which samples random
orthogonal vectors.
A pivotal point in the construction is the Refreshn
F
protocol, which refreshes the
encoding of the secret. It is run by two parties PL holding L and PR holding
R. At the end of the protocol PL outputs L
′ and PR outputs R
′ such that
〈L,R〉 = 〈L′, R′〉 but except of this (L′, R′) is uniform and independent of (L,R).
The only fact about Refreshn
F
, which is used in the security proof presented
in [DF12] is the existence of the reconstructor procedure (an idea introduced
earlier in [FRR+10]). Informally, the reconstructor is a protocol that for inputs
(L,L′) held by PL and (R,R
′) held by PR (where L,L
′, R,R′ ∈ (F \ {0})n)
such that 〈L,R〉 = 〈L′, R′〉 allows the parties to reconstruct the views that they
would have in the Refreshn
F
(L,R) protocol, assuming that (L′, R′) is an output
of Refreshn
F
(L,R).
The Refreshn
F
protocol presented in [DF12] performs O(n2) operations. It
is there used in a „generalized multiplication” protocol as a sub-routine, what
leads at the end to O(n4) blow-up of the circuit’s size while securing it against
leakages. The protocol presented in this note needs O(n) operations to refresh
the secret, what leads to O(n2) blow-up of the circuit’s size.
2 Leakage-Resilient Refreshing of LRS
Similarly as in [DF12] we assume that the players have access to a leak-free com-
ponent that samples uniformly random pairs of orthogonal vectors. Technically,
we will assume that we have an oracle O′ that samples a uniformly random vec-
tor ((A, A˜), (B, B˜)) ∈ (Fn)4, subject to the constraint that the following three
conditions hold:
1. 〈A,B〉 + 〈A˜, B˜〉 = 0,
2. Ai 6= 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
3. B˜i 6= 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Note that although our oracle is slightly different from the oracle O used in
[DF12], it may be easily „simulated” by the players having access to O.
The refreshing scheme is presented in Figure 1. The general idea behind the
protocol is similar to one, which appeared in [DF12]. Denote α := 〈A,B〉(=
−〈A˜, B˜〉). The Steps 2 and 3 are needed to refresh the share of PR. This is done
by generating, with the “help” of (A,B) (coming from O′) a vector X such that
〈L,X〉 = α. (1)
The key difference between our approach and the protocol from [DF12] is a new
and more efficient way of generating such X . Eq. (1) comes from a summation:
〈L,X〉 =
∑n
i=1
LiXi =
∑n
i=1
LiViBi =
∑n
i=1
LiL
−1
i
AiBi = 〈A,B〉 = α. Then,
vector X is added to the share of PR by setting (in Step 3) R
′ := R+X . Hence
we get 〈L,R′〉 = 〈L,R〉+ 〈L,X〉 = 〈L,R〉+ α. Symmetrically, in Steps 5 and 6
the players refresh the share of PL, by first generating X˜ such that 〈X˜, R
′〉 = −α,
and then setting L′ = L + X˜. By similar reasoning as before, we get 〈L′, R′〉 =
〈L,R′〉 − α, which, in turn is equal to 〈L,R〉. Hence, 〈L,R〉 = 〈L′, R′〉.
3 Reconstructor for Refreshn
F
We now show a reconstructor for the Refreshn
F
protocol. Informally, the recon-
structor is a protocol that for inputs (L,L′) held by PL and (R,R
′) held by PR
(where L,L′, R,R′ ∈ (F \ {0})n) such that 〈L,R〉 = 〈L′, R′〉 allows the parties
to reconstruct the views that they would have in the Refreshn
F
(L,R) protocol,
assuming that (L′, R′) is an output of Refreshn
F
(L,R). The key feature of this re-
constructor is that it does not require any interaction between the players. The
only “common randomness” that the players need can be sampled offline be-
fore the protocol starts. These properties are used in a security proof presented
in [DF12].
We now formalize what it means that ReconstructRefreshn
F
is a reconstructor
for Refreshn
F
. This is done by considering two experiments depicted on Fig. 3.
The next lemma shows that these experiments produce the same distributions.
Protocol (L′, R′) ← RefreshnF ((L,R)):
Input (L,R): L ∈ (F \ {0})n is given to PL and R ∈ (F \ {0})
n is given to PR.
1. Let ((A, A˜), (B, B˜)) ← O′ and give (A, A˜) to PL and (B, B˜) to PR.
Refreshing the share of PR:
2. The player PL computes a vector V such that Vi := L
−1
i
·Ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and sends V to PR.
3. The player PR computes a vector X such that Xi := Vi · Bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and sets R′ := R +X.
4. If there exists i such that R′i = 0, then the protocol is restarted from the
very beginning with the new vectors sampled from O′.
Refreshing the share of PL:
5. The player PR computes a vector V˜ such that V˜i := R
′
i
−1
·B˜i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and sends V˜ to PL.
6. The player PL computes a vector X˜ such that X˜i := V˜i · A˜i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and sets L′ := L+ X˜.
7. If there exists i such that L′i = 0, then the protocol is restarted from the
very beginning with the new vectors sampled from O′.
Output: The players output (L′, R′).
Views: The view viewL of player PL is (L,A, V, A˜, V˜ ) and the view viewR of
player PR is (R,B, V, B˜, V˜ ).
Fig. 1. Protocol Refreshn
F
. Oracle O′ samples random vectors (A, A˜, B, B˜) ∈
(F \ {0})n × Fn × Fn × (F \ {0})n such that 〈A,B〉 = −〈A˜, B˜〉. Note that the
inverses in Steps 2 and 5 always exist, because L,R ∈ (F \ {0})n. Steps 4 and
7 guarantee that this condition is preserved under the execution of the protocol
Refreshn
F
. It can be easily proven that the protocol is restarted with a bounded
probability regardless of n (but keeping |F| ≥ 4n), so it changes the efficiency of
the algorithm only by a constant factor.
Protocol ReconstructRefreshnF ((L,R), (L
′, R′)):
Input ((L,R), (L′, R′)): L, L′ ∈ (F \ {0})n are given to PL and R,R
′ ∈ (F \ {0})n are
given to PR.
Offline sampling: Vectors V and V˜ are independently and uniformly sampled from
(F \ {0})n and given to both players.
Reconstructing the “Refreshing the share of PR” phase:
1. The player PL computes a vector A such that Ai := Vi · Li for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2. The player PR sets X := R
′−R and computes a vector B such that Bi := V
−1
i
·Xi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Reconstructing the “Refreshing the share of PL” phase:
3. The player PR computes a vector B˜ such that B˜i := V˜i ·R
′
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
4. The player PL sets X˜ := L
′−L and computes a vector A˜ such that A˜i := V˜
−1
i
· X˜i
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Views: The view viewL of player PL is (L,A,V, A˜, V˜ ) and the view viewR of player PR
is (R,B, V, B˜, V˜ ).
Fig. 2. Protocol ReconstructRefreshn
F
Experiment ExpRefresh(L,R):
Run the protocol RefreshnF ((L,R)).
Output (L′, R′, viewL, viewR).
Experiment
ExpReconstructRefresh(L,R):
Sample L′, R′ ← (F \ {0})n such as
〈L,R〉 = 〈L,R〉.
Run the protocol
ReconstructRefreshnF ((L,R), (L
′, R′)).
Output (L′, R′, viewL, viewR).
Fig. 3. Experiments ExpRefresh(L,R) and ExpReconstructRefresh(L,R).
Lemma 2. For every L,R ∈ (F \ {0})n we have that
ExpRefresh(L,R)
d
=ExpReconstructRefresh(L,R).
Proof. We only show that the equality of distributions holds for the variables
involved in the “Refreshing of the share of PR phase” (the same fact for the other
phase is proven analogously). These variables are
L,R,A,B, V,X,R′.
We prove it showing that each of the above variables has an identical condi-
tional distribution given the previous variables in the series:
1. L,R: Clearly in both experiments (L,R) is constant and identical;
2. A: A is uniformly distributed over (F\ {0})n independently of (L,R). In the
first experiment it comes from the way it is sampled from O′. In the second
scenario it is defined by the equation Ai := Vi ·Li for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence, each
Ai is a product of Vi distributed uniformly over (F \ {0}) and some fixed
non-zero Li. Therefore Ai has a uniform distribution over (F \ {0}).
3. B: B is uniformly distributed over Fn independently of (L,R,A). In the
first experiment it comes from the way it is sampled from O′. In the second
scenario it is defined by the equation Bi := V
−1
i
· Xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Notice
that R′ has a uniform distribution over Fn independent of (L,R,A), so X
defined by X := R′−R is also uniform over F. Hence, each Bi is a product of
some non-zero V −1
i
and Xi distributed uniformly over F and independently
of V . Therefore Bi has a uniform distribution over F.
4. V: V is uniquely determined given (L,R,A,B) by the equation Vi := L
−1
i
·Ai
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (Step 2 in Fig. 1 and Step 1 in Fig. 2).
5. X: X is uniquely determined given (L,R,A,B, V ) by the equation Xi =
Vi ·Bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (Step 3 in Fig. 1 and Step 2 in Fig. 2).
6. R′: R′ is in both experiments equal to L+X .
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